Thanks,
Stitch. In the main, this is a highly creditable post which brings some sensibility to the discussion.
QUOTE (Stitch @ Aug 27 2009, 01:03 AM)

Based on the contract pricing information I have been made privy to, for the most part McVitie is overstating the discount rates - at least historically.
Also, we need to be sure that McVitie is not using current Airbus list prices when calculating discounts on the A380 launch orders. The A380's list has risen scores of millions of dollars so if you take QF's contract price and divide it by today's list compared to the list when they placed the order, the "discount percentage" will be much higher.
I do know that QF didn't pay under $100 million. BA got a screaming deal, but since it includes engines and interiors, I can't break out just the frame price. And even there, it is not 70% off.
As to the A350XWB, we need to remember that airlines seem convinced they have to own CFRP planes. So it's more Boeing and Airbus competing to get the airline to buy THEIR CFRP plane, rather then discounting to get an airline to buy A CFRP plane. In at least a few RFPs, Airbus has offered the A350-800XWB for the same price as the 787-8 and the A350-900XWB for the same price as the 787-9.
The lowest A350XWB contract price I have seen is still less than the 68% that McVitie claims and that that deal included significant high-margin ancillaries as well as additional orders at a very low discount, bringing the discount rate of the entire order into much more "normal" levels that other A350XWB deals were booked at.
There is no way QF paid anywhere near $100 million per A380-800 frame - but I bet you that Alan Joyce and Geoff Dixon surely
wish they had been able to.
There are a couple of other points to consider here, in the overall discussion. Perhaps, McVitie is also including / deducting the subsequent delivery delay compensation payments that some carriers received, in order to make his assessment ? In that case, we would be referring to actual (post) acquisition cost, rather than final 'contract / delivery' price. And, in some cases, these payments were substantial.
Now, while BA might well have received a 'screaming' deal (I have no doubt that such a view is entirely correct), it did not benefit from the delivery delay compensation payments ~ so, as a further enticement, Airbus may well have built some 'soft' additional 'consideration' into their buy price - in order for them to be competitive with the acquisition costs of EK, QF and SQ. Of course, this is 'speculation' on my behalf - but BA are known 'hard' negotiators. And in this instance, there was a lot at stake - for both parties.
However, the biggest problem here .. is that McVitie's recollections / summations are based on historic knowledge that is some 12 years old. Much has changed at both Airbus and Boeing (including public, industry and Government oversight and scrutiny in the wake of scandals at both) in that time .. and I wonder how hardly relevant his comments are to current day negotiations .. apart from anything other than an
historical (and a somewhat hysterical) marker ?