Remarkably most discussion here are about Airbus, while the "action" is accross the Ocean. So lets balance this out a bit.

A question everybody wants to know but nobody dares to ask is "when will Boeing break even on the 787". I wrote down a few considerations. Everybody is free to add.

Costs : the discounts given to launch customers (remember the airlines were cautious in 03-04), the development of new materials and production and systems technology (moving from 10 to 50% composites, electric aircraft), the redesigns, delay payment to airlines for 600-800 aircraft 2.5 yrs and more (slower build up), compensation to the iddle supply chain to remain intact for yrs, the creation of a second final assembly line, compensation for under performance of the first 100 aircraft, and so on.

I sometimes really wonder if the program is still at a profit. Of course Boeing says so, but they are hardly objective and got away with misinforming the industry for yrs.


https://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/sto...lock%20On%20787

My best guess on Break Even:

Say e.g. Boeing delivers 3 Aircraft in 2010, 25 in 2011, 70 in 2012, 84 in 2013 and 120 in the years after. That would mean they could break even around 2018.

The Boeing 787 Dreamliner Break Even Point is at this time probably somewhere around 600-800 aircraft and will not be met before 2018.

All assuming the program goes smoothly from know on.

Does this analysis just look at airframe sales, or does it also include spares, parts and maintenance programs? Old school (pre-Condit and McDonnell Douglas acquisition) was to essentially make the real money long term on parts and service even if it meant breaking even or even losing money on actual airframes because long term Boeing would profit. Obviously once a program was in full swing efficiencies would be gained on manufacturing and production that would lower costs and make the whole program profitable... at least ideally. I'm not an analyst, but I am curious.

A small anecdote.. I once had the pleasure of sitting next to an individual that was instrumental is working with Airbus to establish their maintenance and parts supply chain in the US. Airbus modeled their plan on Boeing's and has reaped the financial rewards that Boeing has always been successful at.

Well at least the 787 will break even, not like some of another aircraft maker's planes.

I think its fair to highlight Rhapsody's point - regardless of the actual time taken, the 787 will break even. Had the program been in a forward-loss position, then the outcome could well be very much different.

IIRC, the b/e on the 737NG shot up to 800 frames because of the late 90's production snarl up - thats long since been surpassed.

Given the compensation payments, delays and $2.5bn write down on the three test articles - I find it difficult to argue against Keesje's range - though much will depend on how quickly the supply chain drives down costs as production goes up - that will have a significant influence on the direction of b/e.

Equally, from two years ago:

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business...38872.html?_r=1

"Several hundred" A350's were required to reach b/e, albeit with a higher sticker price - the A350 costs have risen sharply in the past two years and to suggest a b/e point north of 900 is perhaps at best a conservative guess (notwithstanding the steep discounts at launch which have been known to be greater than those offered on the 787 while playing catch up).

But again, the critical element is that given the surprisingly resilient 787 backlog despite delays, along with the prospect of a second line in the future with options/purchase rights totalling perhaps over 2000 units by 2019, I think the bean counters at Boeing can sleep relatively easily

Lest we forget that the R+D cost for the 787 should not necessarily be applied ONLY to the 787. This is indeed a "game changer" and unlike an, at best, hybrid-type design of the 350, the uniqueness of the 787 will not be duplicated by other manufacturers for decades, and all of Boeing's initial R+D will be exploited on 737/777 replacements, and yes, even 787 replacements. Further, and I will admit to a bit of speculation on this one, I would guess that the current design fix on the 787 will be able to incorporate a more intricate carriage system which will be implemented in a -11 or -12 model as necessary. In all cases, the R+D for the 787 will diminish the development and manufacturing costs of Boeing's future airliners tremendously AND still enable the current program to, in the worst scenario, b/e in less than a decade. The 380 program has not such hope, and it is highly doubtful that any of its R+D cost could ever be offset by future aircraft design programs, given the 787 has and MAYBE the 350 has also transcended that technology. And on that note, it is also doubtful the 350 will reach b/e within the same timeframe as the 787, and it is again doubtful how useful that R+D would be to other programs outside of the 350, given the hybrid nature of the program, as opposed to the 787's obvious leapfrogging.

What the hell is this infantile infatuation with break even?

First the A380. Now the 787. Soon the A350XWB (since it's now claimed to be an additional $7.5 billion "in the hole" because of Airbus supposedly giving all A350XWB customers A350 pricing).

Great, so break-even is now $45 billion. Per initial launch discounts, Boeing is making a minimum of $90 million a frame, so assuming they were all sold for that, that means 500 planes. Of course, only the first tranche of planes went out for that and Boeing has raised the price some $50 million since the original launch, so the real figure will be lower.

Not that the stockholders (the stock continues to show a positive trend since the first flight delay announcement) or the financial analysts (who continue to state their opinion the program will be profitable overall) care.

Not that you'll ever know, because Boeing will never make the final numbers public once the last 787 rolls off the line and the program is closed out. We'll all just assume it did because it sold so many, just as we assume the 707, 727, 737, 747, 757, 767, and 777 programs made money because they all sold so many.

900 ? Interesting. Knowing the A350XWB is not delayed yet or had technical issues. If b/e is indeed 900 for the A350 XWB already I withdraw my 600-800 for the heavily delayed, innovative and problematic Boeing 787. It would be more like 1500 or more I guess.



The A350XWB will contain more composites then the 787 and many of its "lessons learned". You have a point that since rather conventional 777 development in the early nineties the 787 is a leap movement for Boeing to catch on. Now that they have done it the technology can be used for programs like the "Light Twin", competative VLA and 737 replacement. So part of it is an investment into the future.



As said the A350 contains more composites then the 787 but can also relly on enhanced new technology from the A380. The airlines obviously think the A350 is a good idea. When the economy recovers I expect further orders from airlines like BA, LH, Delta, CX, AF/KLM and QF. All have given positive signals. I agree the 787 proved leapfrogging for Boeing.



It costs a lot to produce that frame. Those costs have to be substracted first from that hypothetical $90 million.

What data do you have that the A350 has more composites than the 787?

I'm sorry, I thought we were discussing break-even, which is costs minus revenues.

So if break-even costs are $45 billion, then break-even revenues would also be $45 billion. So that $90 million goes into the "revenues" column and is applied to the "costs" column, which would include the production costs.

I used to be in the enterprise software business. A very competitive and VERY profitable industry throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s. Competitors often answered each others' new product releases with product announcements. Such announcements were designed to prevent prospects from defecting to the newly released product, and instead wait for the newly announced product to be released. This practice would include diatribes in the announcement of how the up-and-coming software would do everything for you from running your company better to providing a more satisfiying sexual experience. It really became quite a joke. The idea was to delay a prospect's purchase of a competitor's product until your product was released. After several years the novelty of this method faded, as companies became numb to the scenario and also realized that it cost too much money to wait for the latest and the greatest and thus bought the released product and installed it in order to benefit from its "magic" today, as opposed to waiting for added "magic" tomorrow. The term used for "announced" releases is "vaporware" as it was non-existent, and was really only real in some software engineer's mind, or in some marketing guy's imagination. So, when people throw around things like, "the 350 has more composite material than the 787...." the idea of vaporware in the enterprise software industry come back vividly. And logically, since we all know that the 350 is a hybrid of old technology and new composite technology (essentially composite panels fastened to a traditional but somewhat modified frame), such a statement as the 350 containing more composite than the 787 really suggests that they don't have their game together at all at Airbus, and the overall weight of the plane will suffer, because under the announced plan, the more composite material Airbus uses, the more traditional material it uses too. So if true, the plane may very well contain MORE composite than the 787, but it would also include MORE traditional material too, thus making the overall weight more than the 787, and potentially not too nominally different that a traditional design. So, the percentage of composites is relatively unimportant compared to the overall weight of the vehicle. Finally, I heard a term on the TV regarding the 787: "Plastic Fantastic." It has a nice ring to it, and I like it.

Yet is the key word here.

Airbus is struggling to make the A350 as light as customers want. Gallois said... "We are fighting against weight as is everybody in the business, and we still have some technical challenges ahead of us, but we're on track for the time being."


Just as Airbus misinformed the industry about the A380 delays for years. Now we know the A380 is not at a profit and will never be:

Gallois said today that A380 costs are "still higher than expected." Gallois said Airbus is examining remedies for the A380. "The learning curve is still too steep for the moment," he said. "We're spending too much money for each plane and we must see how this learning curve brings us to an average price per plane that we can rely on."

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206...id=aRjDYscn4Xrk

Frankly, the whole thing is just a battle of marketing semantics.

By weight of product, the A380 has more composite materials in it's construction than the 787 and the A350XWB, but then the A380 weighs multiples of what the 787 and A350XWB does. And yet does anyone with serious credibility in aerospace consider the A380 to be mostly composites? No.

Airlines bought Boeing's hype that CFRP would change the aviation world just as aluminum did three-quarters of a century ago and they forced Airbus to respond in kind. They also liked the fact that the 787 was offered for about 3/4's the list price of the A330 and with claims it would be significantly cheaper to operate, as well.

Major customers forced Airbus to adopt the same technologies and swear to the same levels of performance. So average list for the A350XWB is anywhere from $2 million (A350-1000XWB vs. 777-300ER) to $10 million (A350-900XWB vs. 777-200LR) cheaper than the 777 and Airbus swears it, too, will be significantly cheaper to operate.

I do believe that the 787 construction process is inherently "lighter" than the A350XWB process and that an A350XWB-800 will be heavier than a 787-9. However, the A350XWB-800 is expected to have a better-performing wing (though I believe people will be very pleasantly surprised at just how good the 787's wing is) and more efficient engines will narrow the gap when it comes down to actual operating and trip-mile costs.

...some of us have been politely mentioning the A350XWB obesity issue for a while. Granted, its taken some time for Gallois to admit it, but its a prelude to program delays of its own as per the musings of a certain Akbar Al Baker...

You don't think it's important for programs to be profitable?
The sooner it it breaks even, the sooner it's in the black.

Miss Piggy offspring?? What did you expect?

Oh I agree it is important for it to be profitable, but in their haste to take swipes at their favorite aerospace piňatas, they end up making asses of themselves.

The 777's widely believed to have run some 50% over her projected budget, but it's also widely believed to be not only well past break-even, but shoveling in profits by the lorry-load with every delivery. So here's the 787, with an order-book exceeding 75% of that of the 777, and now people are claiming with absolute authority and certainty that the program can't make any money.

And Airbus will be selling the A380 for at least five decades (2000-2050). Nobody is going to build anything bigger than her for that time because the only thing that could be bigger - BWBs or Zeppelins - are designed for moving cargo, not people. So to claim with absolute authority and certainty that those next 40 years will result in only a handful more of sales strikes me as ridiculous. Even if the plane only sells an average of 10 a year, that's another 400 planes. And if Airbus only sells an average of 10 a year, the airlines buying it will be doing so because they really have to have it which means Airbus doesn't need to discount to any serious levels which means each of those planes is going to bring in not-insignificant revenue.



It's easy to say that an airplane won't break even early in it's sales life. Consider the 747 in the early 1970s as airlines parked them left and right. Here was a plane that drained Boeing of significant cash that suddenly nobody wanted. Not only did the program look to be a loser, but many thought it would drag Boeing down with it into bankruptcy and liquidation. Yet four decades later, it's considered one of the most successful aircraft programs ever launched and even though it's been totally surrounded by newer and more effective competitors for a decade, it still scores orders and serves proudly in the fleets of many of the world's top airlines.

But the program would have even been more profitable without the cost overruns. I know you're familiar with the time value of money and ROI.


Who said that in this thread? Not even keesje.


Oh, so the airlines who bought the first 200, really didn't need them?


That's because a lot of airlines bought them when they really didn't need them!


Past performance is no guarantee of future returns. As has been discussed before, airlines bought 747s mostly for range, not size. The 777 (and the 787 and A350) match or exceed the A380 in range. So its highly unlikely that the A380 will ever be the sales success the 747 is. Given its high development cost and slow sales, it will never break even. The A380 has been available since 2000 and has sold approx 200 frames. How many 747s were sold in its first nine years of availability? How many 777s have been sold since the A380 first became available? How many 787s and A350s? How many A330s? Your argument sounds like a general fighting the last war.

I've long contended that the VLA market is between 26 and 40 units a year. That is historically what the 747 sold with two current factors in play - a negative one that range no longer requires a VLA, a positive one that the overall market for planes is larger. The initial bookings for the A380 along with the 747 orders during 2000 to 2008 partially "prebooked" average sales. It may be a few years before VLA sales return to their long term averages.

Back to the topic - it was brought up that a number of new tech is on the 787, that should be applicable to other planes, a 777 replacement would be structural scaling of many of the 787 parts, the electrical architecture and other systems should be very easily used in the next model. The 787 and 777RS could basically have common cockpit.

Break even in the 787 case will be VERY dependent on the ramp up and learning curve. It has the potential to have much lower variable costs than the existing planes, but with a far higher fixed cost. We will be able to tell if it is profitable, by the smiles or frowns on the exec's faces.

Counting the -100, -200, and -SP, over 400 747s were ordered AND delivered over a 9 year period from 1966 to 1975 (even though first flight was in 1969 and Pan Am took first delivery in 1970, so really 400+ delivered in the 5 years after Pan Am flew #1), scores and scores more were ordered. Given that the industry will likely lean towards composites in the next 2 decades (and who knows what else in the next 5 decades), I have serious doubts that any airline would order a 380 in 2030, let alone in 2045, as the technology will be ancient. Of course, in 1969, who would have thought that 40 years later Boeing would continue the 747 family with the -8, but Moore's law suggests today's invention will be feasible ( ie efficient) for only half the time of yesterday's technology---thus it will be highly unlikely that any aircraft other than the 787 and possibly the 350 will be ordered past 2020, and even those two aircraft will likely not be ordered past 2035.

A fascinating discussion with interesting conjecturing by all parties. However, one can reach a valid conclusion by conjecture based upon fact, and one can reach an invalid conclusion by conjecture based upon intellectual dishonesty and obfuscation. In either case, truly only time will tell, but should I be fortunate enough to be alive in 2050, I do not think I will look overhead and see a 380 buzz by, and in all honesty, even the CEOs of Boeing and Airbus would be hard pressed to describe what they would likely see in the air in 2050. I will suggest that a 4-engine aircraft in 2050 is as unlikely as coal powered locomotives in 2009, as it would suggest that advances in propulsion will be stagnant for the next 40+ years, so to even hypothisize that Airbus would receive 10 orders per month for a 4 engined plane until 2050 is merely absurd.

Sure, but the damn thing surpassed 900 sales five years after Authority to Offer whereas the 747. 767 and 777 all needed significantly longer times to reach that. Heck, even the 737NG sold more poorly than the 787 from ATO. Demand for the model is so insanely strong that it will easily sell over 1000 frames, so if it needs to sell well under 1000 frames to break-even, then it's guaranteed to break-even and make a profit.



That they continue to take delivery should be a pretty clear sign that they believe they need them.



And yet when the A340-600 provided more payload (by weight), more range (at MZFW) and better economics than the 747-400, Boeing still kept selling 747-400s and airlines committed to buying the A3XX/A380. So there is clearly a market for raw capacity that the A340, the 777, the 787, the A350XWB and even the 747 cannot meet and the A380 can.

Also, the current A380-800 can out-range anything other than a 777-200LR. Even the A340-500 comes up short when carrying a "normal" revenue payload, to say nothing of the 787 and the A350XWB.

So if airlines want range, the A380-800 has plenty to offer now and will only have more to offer down the road as it gets lighter.




This thread exists for one reason - to p*** on the 787 because somebody pissed on the A350XWB in another thread (by claiming it needs "900+ sales" to break-even). It's the same reason we have threads that say the 747-8 will never break-even started in response to threads that say the A380 will never break-even.

Is that what aviation enthusiasts are excited about now? p****** on aviation? People carp about airliners.net being a bunch of 8-year olds endlessly chanting "my big brother can beat up your big brother", but it appears this forum is degenerating to the same level of banality.

HERE HERE!

I've said it many times before on here - we'll never really know, and therefore shouldn't get so wound up over the so-called 'break-even' point for an airframe. It's impossible to quantify the synergies with other aircraft development programmes, so why people on here even try is - as you mention - infantile.

How many city pairs are there that the A380 can do but the 787 and A350 can't?


Hey, no one's forcing you to participate in these forums. Why your infantile infatuation with control and trying to dictate what other people can discuss?
If you're into censorship you'll find plenty of it at a.net.

At full payload? Plenty, I expect, especially on trans-Pacific and Asia-Europe. While Boeing and Airbus are holding the projected Payload-Range charts for the 787 and A350XWB very close to the vest, simulations I have seen using released date show the A380-800 could have upwards of 1000nm more range at MZFW.

And how many of these 'Plenty' city pairs would actually justify an A380 based on passenger volume? Please cite specific routes.

I can see the following cities connected intercontinentally and/or regionally with A380s by 2050:

North America - LAX, SFO, YVR, YYZ, ORD, DFW, MIA, MCO, ATL, IAD and JFK (perhaps EWR, as well)
Japan - NRT, HND, KIX, GUM, SPN (I admit the last two aren't Japanese, but they could support A380 services from HND)
China - PVG, PEK, HKG, CAN, CTU and probably a few others
Southeast Asia - SIN, BKK, HAN
India - DEL, BOM, HYD
Australia - SYD and MEL
Europe - LHR, LGW, FRA, MUC, CDG, MAD, BCN, FCO, MXP, ZRH, AMS, CPH, SVO

You didn't answer the questions. Name specific routes that can't be served by the 787 or A350, and how many of these would actually justify an A380 based on passenger volume?

I forgot a few:

Southeast Asia: ICN, MNL, KUL
Africa: JNB and CAI
North America: MEX and GDL
South America: GRU, EZE, CCS, BOG
Middle East: DXB, AUH, DOH
India: BLR, CCU, MAA

As for specific city pairs, link every city listed in Asia/Australia with every city in Europe and the US. Also link every Asian city more than 4000km apart together. And European capitals to South America and the Middle East. India with the cities on the North American west coast and the Middle East. Africa with the Middle East, the EU and North America. And the Middle East with every other city.

You're still avoiding the question. Are you saying the A380 can do SYD-LHR non-stop? That's news to me.

And SFO-NRT can't be done with a 787?

So let's try this again. List the city pairs the A380 has the range to serve non-stop but the 787 and A350 can't. Then from that list tell us which routes have enough passenger volume to justify using an A380 rather than a 777-200LR.

BeauNG


Very few people would accuse Stitch of infantile infatuation. What you don't see on a.net is certain members trying to scare away others they do not agree with using insults, name calling etc. On other sites you get banned for that.

I'm surprised Stitch even took the time answering your ever renewing questions while he knows nothing can bring you from your taken position. IMO at the same time you yourself could do more to bring new correct info to this site.

The reason they're ever renewing is that he hasn't answered them, but prefers to try to tap dance his way around them. I asked him which cities pairs need be served by the A380, because the 787 and A350 lack the range. He replied with:

That's complete nonsense. SYD-LAX can be served by the 787 and the A350. So can NRT-LAX. So can Rio to Paris. Every Asian city more than 4000km apart can be served by a 787 or A350. Same with Africa and India to the Middle East and the EU to North America.

Oh and keesje, you are the last person to be lecturing anyone about bringing 'new correct info' to this site.

In my opinion asking range questions without taking capasity into consideration is complete non-sense & I think that's a correct assesment.

Neither Boeing nor Airbus have released official Payload-Range charts for the 787 or A350XWB, but general projections put both the 787-9 and A350-800XWB at around 5750nm at MZFW which is what a 777-200ER can do.

So empty, a 787/A350 should be able to fly 9500nm which would link just about any two city pairs in the world. Useful for crew positioning, I suppose, but not much else.

So the issue is not raw range, but usable payload over that range.

The A380-800 is in excess of 6500nm right now, and with improvements in the pipeline, should be able to be around 6750nm around the MSN100 mark (if not earlier).

Of course, with a 787/A350XWB payload (I'll be generous and say 60t at MZFW), an A380-800 could fly over 7500nm today and over 7750nm by MSN100.

So from LHR with a 60t payload, a 787/A350XWB can fly into the light areas and a post-MSN100 A380 can fly into the shaded area:


And from SFO:


And NRT:


Now the above charts assume absolutely zero winds, which would help eastbound and hurt westbound. So SQ, for example, would be unable to fly their 787-9s and A350-900XWBs at full payload from SIN to London and if winds were really bad, possibly much of Western Europe. The same would happen to JQ/QF (who would likely tank up at SIN/DPS). Meanwhile, the A388 can happily make the trip from SIN for both SQ and QF.

From NRT, the Eastern US, Mexico and Central America are out of reach for NH's and JL's 787s without unloading revenue cargo and passengers, though they could get the A388 into all of them.

And so much for QF launching services to SEA with the 787 - at least with a full payload. Nope, if you want to fly from the Middle East, Southeast Asia or Australia to the United States and Canada with 60t, you need to have an A388.

So the following major city pairs can be linked at a revenue payload of 60t with the A388 that cannot be linked with a 787/A350XWB (there will be duplicates):

LHR-SIN
LHR-KUL

NRT-MIA
NRT-MCO
NRT-MEX
NRT-JFK
NRT-ATL

PVG/PEK/HKG/ICN-MIA
PVG/PEK/HKG/ICN-MCO
PVG/PEK/HKG/ICN-MEX
PVG/PEK/HKG/ICN-JFK
PVG/PEK/HKG/ICN-ATL
PVG/PEK/HKG/ICN-SFO
PVG/PEK/HKG/ICN-LAX
PVG/PEK/HKG/ICN-YVR
PVG/PEK/HKG/ICN-YYZ

SIN/KUL-MIA
SIN/KUL-MCO
SIN/KUL-MEX
SIN/KUL-JFK
SIN/KUL-ATL

SYD/MEL-LAX
SYD/MEL-SFO
SYD/MEL-YVR
SYD/MEL-MEX
SYD/MEL-EZE
SYD/MEL-GRU
SYD/MEL-DXB
SYD/MEL-SVO
SYD/MEL-JNB

SFO/LAX-DXB
SFO/LAX-SYD
SFO/LAX-SIN
SFO/LAX-KUL
SFO/LAX-BKK
SFO/LAX-BOM/DEL

JFK-JNB
JFK-ICN
JFK-BKK
JFK-KUL
JFK-JNB
JFK-BOM/DEL
JFK-PVG/HKG/PEK

My point exactly. There are very few routes that need both the range and capacity of the A380. That's why the 777, 787 and A350 are so successful in the market place and the A380 is a BIG flop.

I believe the 77W is popular because it carries less people than the 744 so it forces fares higher, improving yields in a strong traffic market and it's more efficient.

I believe the 787 and A350 are so popular because Boeing snowed the airlines with marketing and convinced them they had to replace their entire Al-skinned mid-sized widebody airliner fleet ASAP lest they be left behind by their 787-operating competitors. This forced Airbus to respond in kind, especially because it allowed them to stop the 777's sales momentum dead in it's tracks (being an Al-skinned airliner and now "obsolete"). So Boeing ended up partially hanging themselves on their own petard by invalidating the 777 with their own marketing spin and now are forced to advance a CFRP-skinned 777-sized model to remain a player in the 300-400 seat market.

The A380 offered both the economics of the A340-600 and 777-300ER with greater capacity than either. Airlines forced by distance or curfew to operate in a narrow band of departure and arrival blocks are buying it and eventually airports are going to become so constrained that they will be forced to force airlines to operate it. Most of the world's 25 largest population centers do not have the luxury of being located in a desert or next to a shallow bay where they can just plop down an airport with 10 runways and 1000 gates. Adding a runway or a terminal to an airport like LHR or ORD costs billions of dollars and takes well over a decade of permitting and lawsuits. Hell even here in little old SEA we spent that much time and money to build a new runway and add a concourse to an existing terminal. And that cost is rolled right back to the carriers resulting in higher landing and gate fees which raises fares which depresses the demand that helped drive the upgrade in the first place.

So you're saying you would fly an A380 with a A350 or 787 payload? Wouldn't that be a rather empty an uneconomical way to operate?

This dialogue could rapidly degrade to intellectual masturbation.

Actually it wouldn't be. 555 passengers and their luggage weigh about 50t. AF and LH get closest to that number (538 and 520+, respectively), but everyone else is under 500 (QF being the lowest at 450). So you can still fly a full load of passengers and their bags between those city pairs and still have many tons of payload lift left over for revenue cargo.



Well we're way off-topic now, anyway, so this is my final comment.

Stitch,

I have a question regarding the 380-800 MZFW @ 6500nm validity? Its payload/range chart on page 3-2-1 showed this. However, this is in conflict with the restated design point of 525P @ 8200nm from the original design point of 555P @ 8000nm. Or, 15P/100nm or 3225# (215#/P)/100nm.

Using the 380 AC data on page 2-1-1,

Max payload = MZFW- OEW = 795869 – 595868 = 200000# @ 6500nm

Payload @ max fuel = MTOW – (OEW + Max fuel) = 1234588 – (595868 + 536494) = 1238998 – 1132362 = 102226# @ 8700 nm

(200000 – 102226)#/ (6500 – 8700) nm = 4656#/100nm or 21.7P/100nm. The steepness of the slope is 6.7P/100nm greater than what the restated design point indicated.

Widebodyphotg analysis has MZFW @ 5700nm. Or,

(200000 – 102226)#/ (5700 – 8700) nm = 3259#/100nm or 15.2P/100nm

This matches the restated design point slope.

The conclusion is that the chart is wrong and that the MZFW is @ 5700nm.

Stitch,

Correct or wrong? If wrong why?

Thanks

Michael

I'm of the opinion that Widebodyphotog's data is out of date. The latest stuff I have seen for him is dated 2007 while the latest Airbus ACAP is November 2008. Also, both flight-test and in-service customer data have proven to be better than Airbus' projections. Therefore, I choose to use Airbus' and the operator's data as I feel it is the most accurate.

Stitch, you rely on improvements in the pipeline after the 100th A380 is produced. However, we can expect the 787 and A350 to also slim down by the time the 100 frame is produced. So you doing an apples to oranges comparison.

Also, you list says the 787/A350 can't do ICN-YVR which is only 4439 nm according to Great Circle Mapper.

Macquarie Equities Research analyst Robert Stallard is quoted in the current issue of Aviation Week as claiming that total 787 penalties are now at $5.1 billion (so $6 million a frame across the current order book), though many of those carriers (ANA, JAL, LAN, Shanghai Airlines, Uzbekistan Airways) are accepting 767s in lieu of cash. He also notes that with so few cancellations, the 787 is still a strongly desired family.

So what is now the consensus estimate for the total 787 program cost? I seem to recall that in 2003 Boeing was estimating a development cost of approximately $8.5 billion, with $5B coming from Boeing and $3.5B from risk-sharing partners. Is my memory totally jaded? If true, the penalties would push the total 787 program up to approximately $13.5 billion - which is not a bad position at all.

I believe your $13.5 B is grossly understated if penalties are anywhere close to those stated. There is not way in h&ll that Boeing can have all this extra work for that amount. I am not anti Boeing, just thankful that Boeing has deep cash pockets. At least it is be written off now so when the airplanes finally come rolling down the two production lines profits should soar.

We will never know the full extent of the costs because Boeing will never release them. Boeing has publicly announced about $4 billion in extra R&D costs, including the most recent write-down of ZA001, ZA002 and ZA003. So one could infer upwards of $15 billion before this $5 billion in penalties is applied.

Boeing's R&D for the initial models of the 777 (772, 77E and 773) is said to have been about $5.5 billion through 1994 - about $2 billion more than allocated for the program in 1992. When you add in other costs (infrastructure, tooling, training, marketing, etc.) Boeing is believed to have invested $10 billion into the "777 Classic" program. And the costs to develop the 77L, 77W and 77F likely added another billion or two (or more).

So when you factor in inflation and such, the 777 program might very well have cost about as much as the 787. Since the 777 is considered astoundingly successful with 1000+ orders, it stands to reason the 787 is also still doing well with 800+ sales (and likely hundreds and hundreds more to come). After all, even if Boeing doesn't make much on the actual raw frame price, there are decades worth of sales of ancillaries (training, spares, support, etc.) that should bring in nice profits.